The Effect of Charter School Competition on Teacher Salaries and Employment in a Unionized Setting

Jason Cook

Using a unique, detailed data set of the universe of Ohio teachers’ union contracts, I estimate the effect of charter school competition on several collectively bargained contract outcomes. I exploit variation in charter school entry in relation to the timing of union contract negotiations through a difference-in-difference framework and find that there are modest decreases to public teacher negotiated salaries in districts facing high intensity charter competition. These decreases erode about 36% of the union salary premium estimated in Hoxby (1996). I instrument endogenous charter entry with plausibly exogenous policy changes that determine when and where charters can locate and find similar estimates.

About Jason Cook

Jason is a economics graduate student at Cornell University. His research focuses on topics in the economics of education and labor economics. Specifically, he is interested in how school choice, in the form of charter and magnet schools, influence the teacher labor market and student outcomes. In another vein of research, he studies the causal effect of providing schools with additional financial resources on short- and long-term student achievement.